ICE’s proposed $100 million intelligence expansion needs clear limits and serious oversight.
More intelligence does not automatically mean greater public safety. Before ICE expands ERO ONE, the government must establish what information can be collected, how it can be used, and who will ensure that the program operates lawfully and responsibly.
I spent much of my career in intelligence collection and analysis. Good intelligence can help public officials recognize a real threat, see how separate events may be connected, and make better decisions before a problem grows. Intelligence can help keep people safe.
I also know that collecting information is only the beginning. Information becomes useful intelligence when trained people evaluate it, check its reliability, consider other explanations, and tell decisionmakers both what is known and what remains uncertain.
Finally, and most importantly, effective oversight, both internal to the intelligence organization and at the congressional level, must be in place to ensure the propriety of what intelligence is being gathered, how it is being collected, why it needs to be collected, and how the institution can prevent mistakes and misuse.
Of immediate concern is Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) plan for a $100 million expansion of its intelligence program called ERO ONE: Enforcement and Removal Operations Overwatch and National Security Enforcement.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) procurement forecast describes a proposed contract for intelligence research specialists to support ERO with “all-source analysis, trend and threat analysis, network and relationship analysis, and field support.” Separate reporting on the statement of work says the plan calls for approximately 142 specialists.
As of October 2026, DHS lists the solicitation and award dates as projections; this is a planned procurement, not an awarded contract.
The question is not simply how much information the government can collect, but whether that information is necessary, reliable, and gathered for a clearly defined purpose. Expanding an intelligence capability without equally strong safeguards risks turning legitimate analysis into unwarranted scrutiny of individuals and their activities.
The concern is what happens when a mission is too broad or the safeguards are too weak. While relationship analysis can help identify connections relevant to a specific threat, it can also sweep in family members, friends, neighbors, or associates who have done nothing wrong. Association is a reason to ask a question; it is not proof of guilt.
Expanding an intelligence capability requires more than funding and personnel. It requires a clear purpose, defined legal authority, and accountability for how information is collected, evaluated, and used. What information can analysts use, and under what authority? Who checks whether a source is reliable before an allegation becomes part of an assessment? How will the government limit access, correct errors, protect personal information, and decide when records should be deleted? And what measurable results would demonstrate that this investment actually improves public safety?
This raises an urgent question: While DHS is expanding its ICE intelligence capability, who will set the rules, review the work, and ensure accountability? Can Congress be counted upon to exercise the oversight necessary to determine whether those rules are being followed?
Realistic and serious Congressional oversight is critical. The administration’s proposed fiscal year 2027 budget would combine Intelligence and Analysis with other DHS headquarters functions. That proposal requires congressional approval and raises an urgent question: While DHS is expanding its ICE intelligence unit, who will set the rules, review the work, and can Congress be counted upon to pursue the necessary oversight to determine if those rules are being followed?
Given the excessive overreach and tactics ICE has demonstrated over the last year, this expansion requires a clearly defined mission, lawful limits on collection, trained analysts, independent review, a means of correcting mistakes, measurable standards of effectiveness, and rigorous oversight.
More analysts and more data will not, by themselves, make the country safer. The government must demonstrate that only on the basis of credible evidence and legitimate, clearly defined requirements, not a person’s beliefs, political speech, lawful protest, or criticism of the government.
The government must be able to explain, in clear, ordinary language, what ERO ONE is meant to accomplish. What specific threats or lawful enforcement intelligence work is necessary, accurate, lawful, and accountable.
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 450 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.
